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When Organization Encounters Uncertainty in Regulatory Times 
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Abstract 
Regulatory policy is a considerable factor in organizational business strategy decisions. 
This article focuses on the organizational adjustment cost under uncertainty brought by 
regulation from game theory and contract theory perspective. Three conclusions are reached: 
1. The cost of adjustment of organizations under regulation in a monopolized industry is only 
affected by their own risk tolerance of uncertainty and the cost of information; 2. when the 
regulation is enacted in a more competitive market, the cost of information would raise with a 
higher expected loss comparing with the same regulation in monopolized market; 3. If the 
claim of such measurement is true, the net benefit or loss of regulation is exactly the 
difference between organizational information cost and regulatory benefit. So the policy that 
guarantees the positive communication and transparent information exchange that helps to 
reduce the organizational information cost is necessary for an efficient regulatory policy. 
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The world economy is stepping in regulatory times. A considerable number of articles 
have technically analyzed and summarized the failure of regulation on organization and the 
global economic downturn (Weber 2010; Levine 2010; Love and Zaidi 2010; Martin and 
Ventura 2011; etc.). Here I would rather to provide a fresh view of the interaction between 
organization strategy and regulation. Donaldson (2000) has pointed out the good economic 
environment should include fair distribution, open government, social cooperation, and 
inculcation of economic duties. Moreover, these ethic factors-and other factors from which no 
actor inside the nation can be excluded-can be further categorized to a common but rich 
concept: Public Wealth (Enderle 2009), including “public goods natural resources in a country, 
basic security, an effectively functioning rule of law, a relatively corruption-free business 
environment, a business supportive culture, a decent level of education and health care of the 
citizens, etc.” (Enderle 2010). On the other side, the individual and organizational activities in 
private sector, or “Private Wealth”, are generally based on the principle of utility or profit 
maximization, as the basic presumption in economics. In most of cases, the economic agents 
in private sector can affect, and also respond to the changes of public environment. Thus the 
regulation will not only regulate public economic environment, but also significantly 
influence the strategies of organizations and individuals. 
 
In this article, I would like to examine the optimal strategies of organization under 
uncertainty, and then derive the efficient regulation requirement by observing these optimal 
strategies based on organizational rationality. However, I wish not to judge the truth with 
sophisticated econometric approach, because it is hard to quantify the outcome of the 
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uncertainty (although sometimes I use willingness of payment of premium to describe the 
level of uncertainty or risk aversion, it still cannot serve as a formal norm), and even the 
quantitative analysis based on the most accurate data cannot completely explain every aspect 
of reality. Thus here I only provide an alternative of view towards the impact of uncertainty in 
regulation.. 
  
I refer the word “Regulation” as the meaning of “Public Regulation”, which is not only 
restricted to the regulation on a single industry, but also on the security, income distribution, 
transportation, public utilities, environment and energy, health care, and other sectors (Fromm 
1981). We can easily find that these fields of public regulation aims at are mostly public 
welfare, which cannot be improved through pure self-interest market competition. However, 
can regulation cure all economic problems without any unanticipated consequences? 
 
In order to illustrate the ambiguous impact of public regulation with uncertainty, I shall 
point out three typical and critical areas that public regulation often focuses on, and we can 
discuss them in following pages: 
 
Security; 
Redistribution; 
Natural Resource. 
 
Security 
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One important goal of public regulation aims at is the security, a typical public good that 
preventing or reducing risk of harm to life and property. The analysis literatures on security 
have ranged from national legislation of public safety to international political economy 
(Kirshner 1995). 
 
Regulation on security can also cause uncertainty in economy. The most obvious 
outcome is that firms have to face raising legal obligations. The most recent case is the 
European Union Advance Cargo Declaration Regime, which has gone into force since 
January 1, 2011. According to the regulation, shipping companies transporting goods to or 
from the European Union must submit specific cargo information with well-prescribed 
timelines to the relevant customs administrations of European Union Member States, and no 
common grace period can be warranted to non-compliant economic operators, which has 
provoked wide complaints of extra administrative and shipping time. 
 
And those regular security regulations, such as national defense and police system, also 
impose costs on economy. The high budget for security regulation may crowd out other 
economic investments. Security regulations imply shifting economic resources between actors, 
including between sellers and buyers and between private and public agents. The existence of 
such a burden will reduce the efficiency of the market and hence growth. (Brück 2005). 
 
The regulation on security can be discussed respectively in monopolistic market and 
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more competitive market. 
 
The outcome of regulation in monopolistic market is straightforward. In the case of 
shipping safety inspection, that monopolistic shipping company does not only have to pay 
specific label printing expense and protracted inspection time as fixed cost, but also the extra 
concern of the probability of insecurity or accident ε(θ), which θ is the risk tolerance of 
company. Intuitively, the higher θ would cause a lower ε. The expected probability of accident 
is 𝑝, thus the revised expected probability of accident is p+ε. The expected revenue of this 
shipping work is 𝑤, expected loss resulting from the accident is σ. So the payoff of the 
shipping without accident is 𝑉 (𝑤), and 𝑉 (𝑤−σ) with accident. Now the expected value of 
this shipping business is:  
𝐸 (𝑉1) = (1−𝑝−𝜀) 𝑉 (𝑤) + (𝑝+𝜀) 𝑉 (𝑤−σ) 
If the company wants to cover the expected loss of accident by fair insurance (suppose 
the insurance market is always perfect competitive that provides fair insurance, and the slight 
unfair insurance will be mentioned in a more competitive case) with the price 𝑞 and 
indemnity 𝑥, to make the value of this trip equal to:  
𝐸 (𝑉2) = (1−𝑝−𝜀) 𝑉 (𝑤−𝑞𝑥) + (𝑝+𝜀) 𝑉 (𝑤−σ−𝑞𝑥+𝑥) 
Suppose parameters 𝑝, 𝑤, σ, 𝑞, 𝑥 stay constant as the given market condition. Then loss 
value σ = 𝑥, premium 𝑞𝑥 = (𝑝+𝜀)σ is the equilibrium1; and for most risk aversion function of 
𝑉(.), 𝐸(𝑉2) ≥𝐸(𝑉1). So the company will prefer the better payoff from insurance.
 
The case in a more competitive market seems more complicated. Now assume there are 
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more shipping companies than monopolistic market but still less than perfect competitive 
market. This market structure allows the insurance companies to change the insurance price 
for difference shipping company by observing the revised expected probability of shipping 
accident, rather than keeping a constant insurance price in monopolistic shipping market. 
Now suppose there are two shipping companies with difference risk tolerance: the higher 
tolerance θ1 and the lower tolerance θ2, so ε(θ1) ≤ ε(θ2) according to the notation in the 
monopolistic market. Thus the insurance company gives a standard price q for the for 
company θ1, and a discriminated price δ for company θ2, because insurance company 
generally is reluctant to insure a company with higher revised expected probability of 
accident. Assume that θ1=θ in monopolistic market. So the payoffs of two shipping 
companies without insurance are: 
𝐸 (𝑉3) = (1−𝑝−ε(θ1)) 𝑉 (𝑤) + (𝑝+ε(θ1)) 𝑉 (𝑤−σ) 
𝐸 (𝑉4) = (1−𝑝−ε(θ2)) 𝑉 (𝑤) + (𝑝+ε(θ2)) 𝑉 (𝑤−σ) 
And the payoffs with insurance are: 
𝐸 (𝑉5) = (1−𝑝−ε(θ1)) 𝑉 (𝑤−𝑞𝑥) + (𝑝+ε(θ1)) 𝑉 (𝑤−σ−𝑞𝑥+𝑥) 
𝐸 (𝑉6) = (1−𝑝−ε(θ2)) 𝑉 (𝑤−δ𝑥) + (𝑝+ε(θ2)) 𝑉 (𝑤−σ−δ𝑥+𝑥) 
In both monopolistic and competitive markets, shipping companies have to pay the fixed 
cost of specific label printing expense and protracted inspection time; but in the competitive 
market, the average premium to cover uncertainty is σ[(𝑝+ε(θ1)) +(𝑝+ε(θ2))]/2, which is 
higher than the premium in monopolistic market σ[(𝑝+ε(θ1)) when θ1=θ. We can conclude 
that the regulatory policy in a monopolistic market produces less cost than more competitive 
market to cover the uncertainty. 
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Redistribution 
 
The regulation on income, wealth, and redistribution is another field that regulatory 
policy often focus, to improve the public wellbeing. However, regulatory redistribution also 
creates uncertainty in the rate of discount of the future income stream (Lermer and Stanbury 
1985). That is, Individual increased wealth that benefit from regulation would be lower in the 
absence of regulation, and the expected value of future return of earnings originally based on 
the market price (interest rate, inflation rate, etc.) has distorted by the non-sustainable 
regulatory redistribution rule with the risk of variance or volatility of regulation policy. 
 
Thus governments do not directly regulating the income distribution, but dictate 
organizations (firms) to balance the income gap. However, there is also uncertainty in 
implementing such redistribution rule in organization, because the redistribution rule is set by 
the head of the organization, and she has no incentive to reduce her profit by processing such 
redistribution policy. So the employee in organizations prefers relational contract to constrain 
the decision of organizations and to cover the uncertainty of losing deserved support. Now set 
the payoff of employee is 𝑠+𝑏−𝐶(𝑎), which 𝑎 is the effort of employees in work which 
influences the revenue of organization 𝑦 (to simplify, set 𝑦=𝑎), 𝐶(𝑎) is the cost of employee to 
exert effort in work, 𝑠 is the original salary of employee, and 𝑏 is the compensatory income to 
balance income gap. So 𝑠+𝑏 can be regarded as the total revenue and 𝐶(𝑎) can be regarded as 
the total cost of the employee. However, the uncertainty is that the organization has 
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probability (1−𝑎) to refuse to provide compensatory income (just set 𝑏=0). Now the 
equilibrium (𝑎,𝑏)=(𝐶’(𝑎), 𝑎∗(𝑏))2. And the payoff of employee becomes 𝑠+𝑎∗(𝑏)∗𝑏−𝐶(𝑎), the 
payoff of the organization is 𝜋=𝑦−𝑠−𝑎∗(𝑏)∗𝑏, So the employee will pay a grim trigger 
strategy, that is, 
1. The employee picks 𝑎∗(𝑏) At the first time; 
2. If the organization provides 𝑏>0 as the redistribution rule requires, employee will still exert 
𝑎∗(𝑏) At the next time; 
3. If ever the organization only offers 𝑠 without 𝑏 (refusing to obey the redistribution rule), 
the employee will always set 𝑎=0 (to simplify, set the opportunity cost of staying in the 
organization is 0). 
Now the organization will pay the positive 𝑏 only if 
 (𝑦−𝑠−𝑏)+𝜋∗𝑝/(1−𝑝)≥(𝑦−𝑠)3 
where 𝑝 is the discount rate of the future revenue that can measure the expectation of the 
organization to the economic condition, which is based on the information of economic 
signals. Intuitively, when 𝑝 is high, the head of organization has confidence in economy and is 
willing to pay compensatory income to support the development of employee; but the low 𝑝 
represents that the head of organization feels the economic prospect is dismal, and then she 
will not want to reduce the profit. 
 
To sum up, although the optimal redistribution rate 𝑏 is endogenous, whether this 
redistribution rule can be implemented depends on the expectation index 𝑝, which is decided 
by the collected information about economic condition. If such information reflects prosperity 
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of economy, the organization will set the optimal redistribution rate of guarantee the fair 
welfare of employee and high profit of organization at the same time, whereas the 
organization will defect the redistribution rule if the report says the economic environment is 
unfavorable. 
 
Natural Resource 
 
The industry related to natural resource has more properties of monopoly than job market 
we have discussed in the last section, since the ownership of natural resource itself can 
produce strong market power. This paper will not undertake benefit-cost analysis to verify 
whether such regulation has positive or negative outcome as many professional issues do, but 
just to depict how the regulation adds uncertainty to organization strategies in regulatory 
economy. 
 
Now we can assume that the regulation aims at the abatement of pollution of an oil 
company, which has to purchase equipment to reduce pollution. The payoff in the first stage is 
𝑅−𝐹, which 𝑅 is the profit without special cost and F Is the special fixed cost of the 
equipment; and the payoff in rest stages are 𝑅−𝑚, 𝑚 is the special cost of maintenance of the 
equipment. Set 𝑝 as the discount rate of the future revenue, which can also reflect the 
expectation of future economic prospect, just as we did in last section. So the expected total 
payoff of the firm in whole regulation duration is  
𝜋1=(𝑅−𝐹)+𝑝(𝑅−𝑚)/(1−𝑝) 
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The firm also has an option to disobey the regulation policy and gets payoff of 𝑅. But 
there is a probability 𝛿 that such behavior may be denounced to government at 𝑡 stage, which 
is based on the ability of the regulator or the degree of supervision, and the firm will be fined 
and enforced to buy the pollution control equipment and the total loss is the fine plus price of 
equipment, 𝑓+𝐹=𝑈. And then the payoff of the firm is 𝑅−𝑚, 𝑈>𝐹>𝑚. Now the expected total 
payoff is 
𝜋2=(1−𝛿)∗𝑅/(1−𝑝)+𝛿∗[𝑅(1−𝑝𝑡)/(1−𝑝)+(𝑅−𝑈)∗𝑝𝑡+(𝑅−𝑚)𝑝𝑡+1/(1−𝑝)] 
The comparison between 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 makes no sense for those big incumbents in this 
industry, because they are never willing to risk their long-year reputation and friendship with 
government, but significantly influences the decision of those obscure and small enterprises in 
such regulatory industry 
Another important player in such market structure is the entrant who wants to entry this 
regulatory industry. For entrant, the payoff function becomes less complicated because the 
entrant must purchase the equipment to meet the requirement of entering under regulation:  
𝜋3=(𝑅1−𝐹)+𝑝1(𝑅1−𝑚)/(1−𝑝1) 
And if this potential entrant enters another industry, the payoff is  
𝜋4=𝑅0/(1−𝑝0) 
Where 𝑅1 is the profit without special cost of equipment the entrant can get when it 
enters in the environment-related industry, and 𝑅0 is the profit in other non-regulated 
industries. Here 𝑝0=𝑝1=𝑝 because 𝑝 is only the discount rate of future no matter in which 
industry. It is obvious now that the entrant will enter the regulatory industry if 
𝑝>(𝑅0−𝑅1+𝐹)/(𝐹−𝑚), otherwise it should enter other industries. 
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So the regulation on natural resource and environment not only impacts some 
incumbents in the industry, but also greatly influences the decision of entrants. There is an 
uncertainty in such long –run regulation besides discount rate 𝑝 is the technology, which may 
change the price or equipment 𝐹 and maintenance cost 𝑚. The impact of 𝐹 is ambiguous 
because it exists on both numerator and denominator; but the impact of 𝑚 is definite, which 
can be regarded as the mandatory rent if an organization wishes to sustain the business in this 
industry. 
 
This result also provides policy insight here. From the result, such environment 
regulation may be not so efficient in blooming economy if the parameters stay constant, since 
the expectation 𝑝 would be very high and every enterprise with 𝑝>(𝑅0−𝑅1+𝐹)/(𝐹−𝑚) will 
want to enter the environment-related industry, which may lead to heavier pollution. So the 
regulator should set higher 𝑚 or add tax on using the equipment every stage to raise 𝑚 in 
prosperity times; and should set lower 𝑚 or offer subsidy in every stage to reduce 𝑚 when the 
regulator doesn’t want to dampen this industry too much. 
 
In conclusion, this paper sweeps the security, redistribution, and natural resource as the 
critical fields of regulation. The analysis focuses on the decision making of organization 
under uncertainty in different content of regulation, by means of insurance, relational contract 
and game theory to indirectly measure the impact of uncertainty. 
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In security field, there are two dissimilar effects in monopolistic industry and more 
competitive industry. In the former one, company has to pay the fixed cost and the premium 
(𝑝+𝜀)σ to cover the uncertainty of regulation; and in the later one, the average cost of 
uncertainty is higher than the one in monopolistic industry. However, in both cases, the cost 
of organization is decided by their own risk tolerance parameters; 
 
In redistribution field, the regulation requires organizations to implement the income 
redistribution according to established redistribution rule. However, the incentive condition 
𝜋>𝑏∗(1−𝑝)/𝑝 of organization to under regulation is primarily based on the uncertain discount 
rate 𝑝, which further depends on the collected information of the economic condition, 
whereas the optimal level of redistribution rate 𝑏 is endogenous in organization; 
 
In natural environment field, the regulation has little effect on those famous and big 
companies because the reputation and relationship with governments are more important than 
the cost of uncertainty, whereas some obscure and small enterprise may have better off from 
deviating from regulation. And the decision of entrants is also greatly influenced by the 
estimation of discount rate 𝑝 and the technology rent 𝑚, which are both uncertain in long run 
regulatory times. 
 
Having said these, the value of information is obvious. The costs of organization to 
overcome the uncertainty in models are all based on the information the organization can get, 
and the accurate information does not only influence the organization strategies, but also help 
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regulators to estimate the proper level of regulation from the information of cost of 
organization. The Sixth Annual MIT Sloan Investment Management Conference asked what 
we should expect in the uncertain and regulatory economy, and this paper is seeking the 
answer. That is, the symmetric information can reduce the extra cost of uncertainty in 
regulation, which calls for, at least, the transparent disclosure and positive communication 
between the government and organization. 
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Notes 
1 In perfect competitive market of insurance, expected profit 𝐸(𝜋)=0, and 
𝐸(𝜋)=(𝑞−𝑝−𝜀)𝑥 
∴ 𝑞=𝑝+𝜀 𝐸(𝑉2)=(1−𝑝−𝜀)𝑉(𝑤−𝑞𝑥)+(𝑝+𝜀)𝑉(𝑤−σ−𝑞𝑥 +𝑥) 
Or 𝐸(𝑉2)=(1−𝑝−𝜀)𝑉(𝑤−(𝑝+𝜀)𝑥)+(𝑝+𝜀)𝑉(𝑤−σ−(𝑝+𝜀)𝑥+𝑥) 
First order condition:  
𝑑𝐸(𝑉2)/𝑑𝑥=−(𝑝+𝜀)(1−𝑝−𝜀)𝑉′(𝑤−(𝑝+𝜀)𝑥)+(𝑝+𝜀)𝑉′(𝑤−σ−(𝑝+𝜀)𝑥+𝑥)(1−(𝑝+𝜀))=0 
𝑤−(𝑝+𝜀)𝑥=𝑤−σ−(𝑝+𝜀)𝑥+𝑥 
σ=𝑥 
𝑞𝑥= (𝑝+𝜀)𝑥=(𝑝+𝜀)σ 
 
2 Max 𝑠+a𝑏−𝐶(𝑎) 
First order condition: 
𝑏=𝐶′(𝑎),𝑎=𝑎∗(𝑏) 
 
3 The payoff of the organization in whole regulation time is 
(𝑦−𝑠−𝑏)+𝜋p+𝜋𝑝2+𝜋𝑝3+⋯+𝜋𝑝𝑛=(𝑦−𝑠−𝑏)+𝜋∗𝑝/(1−𝑝), which must be larger than 
(𝑦−𝑠)+0+02+03+⋯+0𝑛=𝑦−𝑠, if the head of organization has incentive to sustain such 
relationship and profit gaining.   
